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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-2785 
_______________ 
 
IN RE:  LILLIAN P. IANNINI, 
  
                         Debtor 
 
Lillian P. Iannini, 
 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, 
in trust for the registered holders of AmeriQuest 
Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed 
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-118 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00055 
D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00101) 
District Judge: Hon. Joy Flowers Conti 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 21, 2011 
 
BEFORE: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN , Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: July 6, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
  Lillian P. Iannini appeals from the memorandum order of the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania affirming the orders previously entered by 
the Bankruptcy Court.  Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Iannini‟s adversary 
action against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee, in Trust for the 
Registered Holders of AmeriQuest Mortgage Securities, Inc., Asset-Backed-Pass-
Through Certificates, Series 2004-118 (“Deutsche Bank”).  It also granted Deutsche 
Bank‟s motion for relief from stay with respect to Iannini‟s core bankruptcy case.  While 
this current appeal was pending, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the core bankruptcy 
case because of Iannini‟s default.  We accordingly will dismiss this appeal as moot. 
I. 
 This appeal arises out of a mortgage purportedly held by Deutsche Bank on a 
residence in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, which was jointly owned by Iannini and her son, 
James Iannini.  Claiming that the owners failed to make their monthly mortgage 
payments, Deutsche Bank filed a foreclosure action in the Beaver County Court of 
Common Pleas.  On February 28, 2008, the state court granted its motion for summary 
judgment.  Following several postponements because of James Iannini‟s bankruptcy 
filings, the sheriff‟s sale ultimately took place on November 17, 2008.  Without objection, 
Deutsche Bank purchased the property for $4,860.36.  The deed was then dated and 
recorded on January 2, 2009, and Deutsche Bank commenced an ejectment action in the 
Beaver County Court of Common Pleas. 
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 Over the course of the foreclosure action, James Iannini filed for bankruptcy on 
three separate occasions.  Approximately a year after he filed for bankruptcy in November 
2006, his case was dismissed without prejudice due to his default under the Chapter 13 
plan.  His second bankruptcy case was then dismissed on July 11, 2008 because he failed 
to obtain credit counseling.  Finally, his third bankruptcy case was dismissed with 
prejudice on October 28, 2008 on account of his failure to make regular plan payments, 
and he was specifically barred from filing for bankruptcy or invoking the provisions of 
the automatic stay in connection with the property for a period of 180 days.   
 On March 26, 2009, Iannini filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.  On July 6, 
2009, she filed an adversary complaint against Deutsche Bank, claiming, inter alia, that 
the sheriff‟s sale constituted an unlawful fraudulent transfer of her property.  Deutsche 
Bank moved to dismiss the adversary action, and it also requested that the Bankruptcy 
Court either dismiss the underlying core bankruptcy case or grant relief from the stay.  On 
December 2, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court, after hearing oral argument, concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that Iannini otherwise 
failed to advance any viable claims against Deutsche Bank under 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 544, 
or 548.  It accordingly dismissed the adversary action and granted relief from the stay, 
while also denying Deutsche Bank‟s motion to dismiss the core bankruptcy case itself.  
Formal orders were entered on December 3, 2009, and Iannini then appealed to the 
District Court. 
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 In a memorandum order entered on May 25, 2010, the District Court affirmed the 
Bankruptcy Court‟s ruling in favor of Deutsche Bank, specifically concluding that 
Iannini‟s adversary action was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that she failed 
to bring a proper claim under §§ 522, 544, or 548.  Iannini filed a timely notice of appeal.  
However, while the current appeal was pending before this Court, the Chapter 13 Trustee 
filed a declaration with the Bankruptcy Court on August 24, 2010 indicating that Iannini 
was in default under her plan because of a failure to make monthly plan payments.  The 
Bankruptcy Court accordingly dismissed the core bankruptcy case without prejudice on 
August 26, 2010 and then denied Iannini‟s motion for reconsideration in an order entered 
on October 25, 2010. 
II. 
 We agree with Deutsche Bank that this appeal must be dismissed as moot.  We 
therefore need not (and do not) reach the other issues raised in the parties‟ briefing.   
“[I]f an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for 
the court to grant „any effectual relief whatever‟ to a prevailing party, the appeal must be 
dismissed.”  Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) 
(quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).  It is undisputed that the core 
bankruptcy case was dismissed by the Bankruptcy Court due to Iannini‟s default.  In turn, 
Iannini expressly “concedes the case is moot unless it is considered capable of repetition, 
yet evading review.”  (Appellant‟s Brief at 9.)  According to her, this exception is 
satisfied because, among other things, “Congress limited the time a Debtor may remain in 
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a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to 5 years” and she purportedly could still file another 
bankruptcy petition and pursue her claims against Deutsche Bank.  (Id. at 9-10 (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 1325).)    
Nevertheless, Iannini does not meet this mootness exception.   It is well 
established that a court may consider the merits of an otherwise moot case when: (1) the 
challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or 
expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same party will be subject to 
the same action again.  See, e.g., Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2007).  
This exception is a narrow one available “„only in exceptional situations.‟”  Id. (quoting 
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)).  At the very least, the issues presented 
here, even if we assume arguendo that they are capable of repetition, do not actually 
evade review.  We note that this Court has ruled on the merits of the Rooker-Feldman 
issue raised in this appeal on two prior occasions.  See In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 
(3d Cir. 2009); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 578-83 (3d Cir. 2005).  We further observe 
that it was Iannini‟s own default by failing to make the requisite monthly payments that 
resulted in the dismissal of her core bankruptcy case and ultimately rendered her current 
appeal moot.              
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds.   
